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Introduction:
In March 2003, as Americans prepared for the invasion of Iraq, their efforts to 
understand the looming confrontation were filtered through the memories of past 
crises.  As they sought guidance from history, memories of two events seemed 
to dominate their thinking about Iraq.  One was remote enough to have been 
experienced by only a small fraction of Americans, the other, more recent one, 
was thought to have scarred an entire generation.  The first historical memory 
was the Munich Conference of 1938.  Munich made appeasement a dirty word 
in American politics.  For American politicians, policymakers, and opinion 
leaders, the lessons of Munich are unmistakable.  Put simply, which is how it 
is most often put, the lesson was that “you cannot appease dictators.”  For Cold 
War policymakers, most of whom had lived through World War II, the lesson of 
Munich became a guiding principle in moments of crisis.  The lesson survives 
today, kept alive by a generation of leaders who have only read about World 
War II.  During the first and second Persian Gulf Wars, 1991 and 2003, Saddam 
Hussein was constantly compared to Adolf Hitler.  Brutal, tyrannical, cruel and 
sadistic, the mustached Iraqi dictator seemed well suited for the part.  The lesson 
of Munich pointed toward a seemingly indisputable conclusion, Saddam could not 
be trusted.  He had to be removed from power.
The second memory that dominated American thinking about Iraq in early 
2003 was of Vietnam.  Unlike Munich, there was no simple lesson to be drawn 
from the American experience in Vietnam.  In 1990, 78% of Americans viewed 
American intervention in Vietnam as a mistake.  A staggering 89% rejected the 
idea that America should have “gone all out to win” the war.  Those figures would 
seem to indicate strongly that the memory of Vietnam would act as a break on 
future American military operations.  Such was not the case.
There are, of course, multiple reasons why Americans disregarded their 
memories of failure in Vietnam and went to war in 2003.  The most obvious was 
that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed American thinking about 
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the risks of war.1  President Bush encouraged Americans to regard September 11th 
as a watershed event that created a break with the past.  Moreover, the president 
and his advisors frequently linked Saddam to the terrorist attacks of September 
11.  The failure to act, warned the president, could result in a mushroom cloud 
appearing over an American city.
The American public’s acceptance of these arguments at the time may well 
have been enough to make them forget Vietnam and support the war against Iraq. 
By itself, that conclusion does not appear to be very novel.  But I would like to 
take the argument a step farther and suggest that what Americans remember about 
the Vietnam War actually facilitated the Bush administration’s plan for war.  Put 
more starkly, I would argue that memories of the Vietnam War have been used to 
quell dissent and build support for the Iraq war.
In order to explore this hypothesis in more detail, I will need to talk about 
what is usually termed collective memory.  The idea of collective or public 
memory has received considerable attention from historians during the last twenty 
years.2
Most studies of memory begin with several assumptions.  The first is that 
memory is a reconstruction of the past, not a reproduction.  This means that 
attempts to preserve the past inevitably alter it.  A second assumption is that 
decisions about what to preserve inevitably result in decisions, conscious or 
unconscious, to ignore or forget some other aspect of the past.  Frequently, 
those decisions are culturally and politically sensitive, especially since what is 
remembered is crucial to a society’s identity and sense of itself.  Those groups that 
have a stake in what is remembered debate, challenge, and contest which version 
of the past will be remembered.  And those debates reflect present day concerns.
In this way, contemporary issues contribute to a framing of the past.  The 
extent to which the present shapes the past is a subject of debate among scholars. 
Some argue that there are limits to how far a group can go in transforming the 
past to suit the present.  Others argue that in our consumer oriented society the 
1 In using force to liberate Kuwait in 1991, President George H. W. Bush famously declared 
that the U.S. had “kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.”  That conclusion was 
premature. In fact, the memory of Vietnam haunted policymakers. American military leaders 
planned operations in the war to avoid getting the U.S. bogged down in another Vietnam 
like quagmire.  That is why the president agreed to halt operations well before Saddam was 
overthrown.
2 The starting point for most scholars is Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory  (Chicago, 
1992), edited, translated, and with an introduction by Lewis Coser;  and Paul Connerton, How 
Societies Remember  (Cambridge, 1989). For helpful introductions to the subject see David 
Thelen, “Memory and American History,” The Journal of American History 75 (March 1989), 
1117―1129;  Barry Schwartz, “Social Change and Collective Memory:  The Democratization 
of George Washington American Sociological Review 56 (April 1991), 221―236;  and 
John Bodnar, Remaking America:  Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the 
Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1992).
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past can be transformed into a marketable commodity, such as a Hollywood 
movie, that can become completely detached from its original context for 
commercial purposes.  It is not necessary to resolve this debate here.  For our 
purposes it suffices to note that most scholars agree that in creating collective 
memories, societies are not bound by the same rules of evidence and logic that 
discipline historians.
In assessing the influence of collective memory on American thinking about 
the war in Iraq I will look at two overlapping types of remembering.  One is 
what might be termed institutional memory that has been preserved and nurtured 
within the American armed forces, especially the U.S. Army.  The other is the 
more commonly discussed public memory of the larger segment of the American 
population.  The way Americans remember Vietnam has been shaped by political 
rhetoric, a vast memoir and historical literature, television news programs and 
documentaries, official memorials and monuments, and entertainment media such 
as Hollywood movies and television.  A comprehensive study of how Americans 
remember the Vietnam War is beyond the scope of this presentation.  Instead, 
my main purpose is look at the ways that certain aspects of Vietnam memories 
influenced public discussion in the United States before the war with Iraq.
The myth of anti-war protest as anti-soldier.
Perhaps the most pervasive “memory” of the war is that of anti-war protestors 
denouncing the Americans who fought the war.  The most indelible image in this 
regard is the mental picture that people have of protestors spitting on veterans. 
This belief has been transmitted across generations making it a vivid secondary 
memory.  On several occasions my college students have related family tales of 
veterans being harassed and spat upon by protestors.  Upon closer investigation 
these stories became more vague and uncertain.  The stories themselves were 
real in the sense that they conveyed honest feelings and emotions, but the 
incidents they related were imagined.  In fact, it is doubtful that protestors even 
had opportunities for directly confronting veterans in the manner depicted in the 
popular myth.3  Moreover, no incidents of the protestors “spitting” on veterans 
have been documented.  As it turns out, the only verifiable case occurred as a 
scene in a grade B movie.
Nevertheless, starting with President Richard Nixon, policymakers attacked 
the motives of the protestors by claiming that their hostility towards the war 
was really directed at the loyal men who served the country in Vietnam.  In their 
speeches, Nixon and his advisors rhetorically “repositioned” protestors from in 
front of draft induction centers, where they picketed against the sending of young 
men to Vietnam, to the airport lobbies of the myth, where they allegedly spat on 
3 Jerry Lembcke, The Spitting Image:  Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam (New York, 
1998).
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returning veterans and accused them of being baby killers.4  The effectiveness and 
power of this myth has been significant.  It is also somewhat surprising given that 
very few newspaper stories at the time depicted protestors as being anti-G.I.5
The myth of the anti-war protestor endured beyond the war.  During the 
1980s, President Ronald Reagan frequently depicted veterans as having been 
betrayed by weak willed politicians, liberal journalists, and the privileged children 
of the elite who protested the war from the safety of their college campuses.6  The 
consequences of this campaign to tar the opponents of war as unpatriotic and 
hostile to the troops were evident immediately before the first Gulf War.  As I 
noted, by that time most Americans regarded the Vietnam War as a mistake.  Yet 
when they were asked if they wished they had actively protested against the war 
67% answered no.  We cannot know what reasons the respondents would have 
given for their answers, but at the minimum it seems clear that most did not view 
public protest as a commendable act of civic responsibility.
When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, the sprouting of “Support our troops” 
ribbons and bumper stickers, and television commercials masquerading as 
public service announcements attested to the widespread belief that the proper 
response in wartime is to support the troops.  It followed that if one were to raise 
questions about their mission then he or she would not be supporting the troops. 
The pervasive image of war protestors as unpatriotic has forced the present day 
anti-war movement into contortions trying to make clear their support for the 
troops at the same time they oppose the war.  The results suggest such efforts 
have been unproductive at best.  News stories about the efforts of protestors to 
avoid the supposed sins of the past, meaning Vietnam, ignore the anti-war part of 
their message and emphasize their support for the troops, and by implication, the 
war itself.  The treatment that presidential candidate John Kerry received in the 
2004 election further attests to the sulfurous odor that still clings to the anti-war 
protestors of the 1960s.  Much has been made of the assault on Kerry’s war record 
by Republican operatives.  But I am inclined to think that the most damaging part 
of the attack was the constant exposure given to Kerry’s participation in the anti-
war movement when he returned from Vietnam.  It would appear that for many 
Americans, Kerry’s protests were a betrayal of the comrades he left behind in 
Vietnam.
The association of anti-war protestors with disloyalty during the Vietnam 
era continues to haunt opponents of the Iraq War today.  Former Democratic 
4 “Who Supports the Troops?  Vietnam, the Gulf War, and the Making of Collective Memory,” 
by Thomas D. Beamish;  Harvey Molotch;  Richard Flacks Social Problems, 1995.
5 Ibid.
6 Reagan also did much to inflate the myth that scores of Prisoners of War had been left behind 
in Vietnam, abandoned and neglected by soulless bureaucrats and liberal politicians. Mark 
Taylor, The Vietnam War in History, Literature and Film (Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 2003), 141―
143.
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Party strategist Paul Begala has noted that “the popular memory” of the anti-war 
movement is not about Democrats being proved right about the war in Vietnam. 
According to Begala, what people remember is “the indelible image of young 
Americans burning the American flag.”7
Depoliticizing Vietnam Memories.
The depiction of anti-war protestors as hostile to American soldiers was 
part of a deliberate political strategy to undermine opposition to the war.  That 
strategy was successfully employed during the 1980s and 1990s to undermine 
opponents of American military programs.  Opponents of American military 
adventures regularly had to fend off charges that they were betraying the young 
men and women who risked their lives to make the nation safe.  The general sense 
of elation that came with America’s victory in the Cold War made it even more 
difficult to be seen as a critic of government policies.  Under these circumstances, 
it is easy to see how the image of war protestors as anti-soldier would dampen 
the spirits of anti-war activists.  But memories of Vietnam have not been simply 
contrived by political leaders.  American popular culture has played a major 
role in determining how Americans have remembered Vietnam.  Although the 
messages contained in American popular culture are by no means uniform and 
in most cases are not overtly political, they nevertheless contributed to a public 
remembering of Vietnam that facilitated American intervention in Iraq.
Students of Vietnam War movies have shown how most films of that 
genre present the G.I. as a victim.  In earlier films he was often portrayed as a 
psychologically damaged criminal.  The sacrifices and suffering of the soldiers, 
or what Vietnam did to them, and us, is the major theme of those movies.  This 
may help to explain why 69% of Americans believe that veterans were mistreated 
by the public even though 87% of those same Americans claim that they have a 
favorable opinion of Vietnam veterans.  Most commentators have concluded that 
the impact of film on collective memory has been profound.  David Halberstam, 
one of the journalists who covered the early stage of the war, made this point 
when he observed that “Thirty years from now, people will think of the Vietnam 
War as [the movie] Platoon.8
That possibility may disturb historians, but it has been even more upsetting 
to others who worry about depictions of veterans in film.  Author and veteran 
Michael Lee Lanning has complained that no group has been more maligned in 
film than Vietnam veterans.  One of Lanning’s chief complaints is the usual one 
that movies are often inaccurate.  But Lanning’s own preference for the American 
government’s version of the Vietnam War is demonstrated by his awarding 
 7 “A split over war, the wimp thing, and how to win,” by Dick Polman, Philadelphia Inquirer, 
http://www.philly.com/mid/inquirer/12434269.htm
8 Quoted in Taylor, Vietnam War, 10.
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the Hollywood propaganda film Green Berets three out of four stars.  For our 
purposes, it is important to note that Lanning’s preoccupation with the image of 
the soldier in film reflects Hollywood’s emphasis on the experience of the GI in 
the Vietnam.9  In other words, the war is remembered as an intensely personal, 
American event.  Political causation and explanations for the war rarely enter 
into these depictions.  It is even more noteworthy that the Vietnamese are often 
relegated to bit parts in their own war.
As I noted earlier, historians generally agree that one of the characteristics 
of collective memory is that remembrances of the past can be reframed by the 
present.  The recent memory boom that lionized the men who fought World War II 
as The Greatest Generation appears to have had that effect on the way Americans 
remember the Vietnam War today.  An example of this interaction between 
representations of the past and present may be found in the impact that the movie 
Saving Private Ryan, an offshoot of the Greatest Generation phenomenon, has 
had on the way Americans depict war.  The gripping opening scene of the movie 
takes the viewer on to the beaches of Normandy during the first hours of the 
invasion.  The audience is cast into the midst of a terrifying scene of random 
death and havoc.  The apparent authenticity of that opening sequence made such 
an impression on audiences that it seems to have created a template for retellings 
of the Vietnam War.  In one example of this trend, reporters for the Philadelphia 
Inquirer opened their retrospective series on the Vietnam War by placing readers 
in the midst of a fierce set piece battle in the manner of Saving Private Ryan.10  
Such battles were rare in Vietnam nevertheless, the reporters made that appear 
to be the central experience for the American soldier.  The result, as historian 
Christopher DeRosa has put it is “the Private Ryanization of Vietnam.”
An additional side effect of the World War II memory boom was to further 
validate the widespread practice of having Vietnam veterans speak to classes 
about their experiences.  These personal histories carry great weight with 
audiences.  A recent study of how Americans think about the past has shown that 
most Americans regard museum exhibits, artifacts, and personal narratives as 
the most authentic and truthful forms of history.11  Veterans seem to share these 
beliefs.  Supporters of a war memorial in Philadelphia have expressed concern 
that “For a whole generation, [Vietnam] is a war in a distant place, a long time 
ago.  For most high school students today, the Vietnam War is as relevant as the 
War of 1812.”  In order to avoid this fate, the Philadelphia area veterans hoped to 
create a $2 million endowment to fund a memorial and “to help establish a ‘living 
9 Green Berets is described as a movie that “will bring pride to any veteran….” Michael Lee 
Lanning, Vietnam at the Movies (New York, 1994), 236.
10 A Village, A Hill And Horror:  A Tragic Battle Early In The War Stood As A Harbinger Of 
Things To Come For U.S. Troops, April 16, 2000, Philadelphia Inquirer.
11 Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen, The Presence of the Past:  Popular Uses of History in 
American Life (New York, 1998), 89―114.
20 NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES  27 / 2005 21NANZAN REVIEW OF AMERICAN STUDIES  27 / 2005
history link’ with Philadelphia schools so that students could learn from those 
who were there.”
For historians, this emphasis on personal stories and memories is problematic 
for several reasons.  One is that memory is notoriously unreliable.  Indeed, the 
more we learn about the way humans store and recall information, the more 
reason we have to doubt the accuracy of our own memories.  Take, for example, 
the memories many Vietnam veterans have of returning home “to the world” on 
regularly scheduled commercial flights from Vietnam.  These veterans insist that 
their return flights took them directly from Vietnam to some civilian airport on 
the West Coast.  Those memories have been crucial in lending credence to the 
pervasive belief that veterans were spat upon and ridiculed by protestors waiting 
for them in the airports.  In reality, the planes that carried veterans home were 
chartered civilian airliners that landed at military installations in the U.S.  When 
one considers that these special flights even carried the normal compliment 
of stewardesses, it is easy to see how veterans might be tricked by their own 
memories.12
Another reason for worrying about the emphasis on personal memories 
of Vietnam is that individual soldiers rarely had much information on or 
understanding of why the United States was there in the first place.  Listening to 
veterans remembrances with a critical ear can teach us much about what it meant 
to be in Vietnam.  But it is doubtful that we will learn much about the causes of 
the war, the strategies employed, or the Vietnamese.  Without an appreciation 
of the motives that sent Americans to Vietnam in the first place and without 
knowledge of what the Vietnamese wanted, how can Americans answer one of the 
most fundamental questions of the war:  Was it moral?
Historian Carolyn Rosenberg has suggested that one reason that these more 
complicated matters go begging for attention is that the historical profession 
itself has taken flight from the study of powerful white men who make policy 
and direct the country in wartime.  She commends the profession for becoming 
more inclusive and looking at history from the bottom up but she also laments 
the extent to which traditional political-military subjects have been sacrificed 
in the process.13  To this, one may add the present emphasis in popular culture 
that gives priority to experiences that affect one directly, often with a therapeutic 
goal in mind.  Here I have in mind the popularity of television programs such as 
“Oprah” and “Dr. Phil.” The pervasiveness of this trend is illustrated when we 
consider that even professional historians whose job it is to teach the history of 
the war succumb to the therapeutic approach.  As one historian at a major public 
university explained, his Vietnam War course became a way that his students 
12 H. Bruce Franklin, Vietnam and Other American Fantasies (Amherst, MA, 2000).
13 Eisenberg, “Was Anything Learned from Vietnam?” 9 January 2006, History News Network, 
http://hnn.us/articles/20259.html
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could begin to connect to the experiences of their fathers.14  Such an outcome may 
be laudable but it was achieved by substituting personalized accounts of the war 
for a more standard diplomatic history of the war.
Thus far I have suggested that the American public’s memory of Vietnam 
has taken shape in such a way that made opposition to the war in Iraq unlikely 
and even facilitated the country’s momentum towards involvement.  A collective 
memory that casts protestors in an unfavorable light and views anti-war 
demonstrations as hostile to soldiers has tipped the balance in public discussions 
toward military involvement.  Similarly, the emphasis in popular culture on seeing 
the war at ground level, through the soldier’s eyes leaves Americans ill-equipped 
to ask vital questions about the war’s purposes.
These collective memories of the war have been formed by various processes. 
Political leaders sought partisan advantage through a calculated use of Vietnam 
images.  Hollywood created compatible images largely for commercial gain.  The 
public’s own preference for “authentic” stories over accounts filtered through 
historians also contributed to the particular emphasis on Vietnam as something 
that happened to Americans.
As far as many professional military officers were concerned, Vietnam was 
something that happened to them.  Grievances against the presumed anti-war 
bias of liberal journalists form a common thread running through the memoirs 
of professional officers.  Research has undermined arguments that biased reports 
in print and television journalism turned American opinion against the war. 
Studies of television reporting have also debunked the widely held belief that 
the carnage Americans supposedly viewed while watching the war in their living 
rooms turned them against the war.15  Nevertheless, the pervasive belief that the 
“media” contributed to America’s loss in the Vietnam War became a staple of talk 
radio and political campaigns.  My own classes offer anecdotal evidence of how 
pervasive this secondary memory has become.  During the last ten years students 
in my various research seminars and military and diplomatic history classes 
have frequently volunteered their views that the “media,” particularly television, 
undermined the American effort in Vietnam.  Aware of such public skepticism, 
journalists and news organizations have bent over backwards to avoid similar 
charges in every war since, including the current one in Iraq.
For professional military officers, the easiest way to avoid the problems they 
encountered in Vietnam was to make sure that there would be no more wars like 
the Vietnam War.  In the 1980s, the Army remade itself into a volunteer force 
designed to confront the Soviet Army on the more hospitable battlefields of 
14 “Finding their Fathers. Teaching the Children of the Vietnam War,” by Peter Filene The 
Journal of American History 84 (1999).
15 Scholars place far more emphasis on casualties as a determinant of opinion.  John Meuller, 
War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York, 1973);  William Hammond, “The Press in 
Vietnam as Agent of Defeat, Reviews in American History (June 1989), 318―321.
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Europe.  General Creighton Abrams, the new Army’s chief architect went so far as 
to reconfigure the Army so that any full scale operation would require the calling 
up of National Guard units.  Abrams’s purpose was to make sure that no president 
could send troops into a major conflict without the full support of the American 
people.16
Perhaps the most widely held lesson which has been transmitted to the current 
generation of policy makers is that the U.S. lost in Vietnam because it lacked a 
clear and definable goal for the application of force.  No one has done more to 
popularize this lesson than former General Colin Powell.  Indeed, even though this 
policy stricture was first annunciated by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger 
in the 1980s, it has become known to the public as the Powell Doctrine.  In 
his memoirs Powell, a junior officer during the Vietnam War, blamed civilian 
leaders for failing to define clear American objectives in Vietnam.  This is at best 
a dubious assertion.  As historians George Herring and Russell Weigley have 
pointed out, the U.S. did spell out its goal in Vietnam.  The goal was to defend a 
democratically viable South Vietnam.  The United States failed not because the 
goal was unclear, but because it was unobtainable through any of the means the 
U.S. had at its disposal.17
Nevertheless, the Powell Doctrine seemed to grow in stature as its author 
rose in prominence in official Washington during the 1980s and 1990s.  Powell’s 
critique of the Vietnam War was intended to place limits on the use of American 
force.  By trying to set up criteria for when the U.S. should go to war, Powell 
subsequently came in for considerable criticism.  According to his detractors, 
Powell was challenging the hallowed principle of the military’s subordination to 
civilian authority.  As it turned out, Powell created only a minor obstacle to the 
future use of force by American leaders.  In effect, by ignoring the deeper reasons 
for America’s defeat in Vietnam, Powell’s criteria made it surprisingly easy for 
future presidents to go to war.  To satisfy Powell’s requirements, and thus indicate 
that he had learned the lesson of Vietnam, a president simply had to assert that he 
possessed a clear objective for the use of American military force.
As the following exchange from one of his rare press conferences shows, 
President Bush recognized that the supposed restraints imposed by the Powell 
Doctrine could be easily overcome.
QUESTION:  Mr. President, millions of Americans can recall a time when leaders 
from both parties set this country on a mission of regime change in Vietnam.  Fifty 
thousand Americans died.  The regime is still there in Hanoi, and it hasn’t harmed or 
16 Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism:  How Americans are Seduced by War, 
38―56.
17 Herring is cited in Russell F. Weigley, “The American Military and the Principle of Civilian 
Control from McLellan to Powell, Journal of Military History 57 (Special issue, October, 
1993), 27―58;  idem, “The Soldier, The Statesman, and the Military Historian, JMH 63 (October 
1999).
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threatened a single American in the 30 years since the war ended.  What can you say 
tonight, sir, to the sons and the daughters of the Americans who served in Vietnam to 
assure them that you will not lead this country down a similar path in Iraq?
THE PRESIDENT:  That’s a great question.  Our mission is clear in Iraq.  Should 
we have to go in, our mission is very clear:  disarmament.  And in order to disarm, 
it would mean regime change.  I’m confident we’ll be able to achieve that objective, 
in a way that minimizes the loss of life.  No doubt there’s risks in any military 
operation;  I know that.  But it’s very clear what we intend to do.  And our mission 
won’t change.  Our mission is precisely what I just stated.  We have got a plan that 
will achieve that mission, should we need to send forces in.”18
In reading the above transcript it is easy to see that the president missed 
the point of the journalist’s question.  Whether this was intentional or not is 
not something we can answer here.  The journalist was making that point that 
an earlier generation of American leaders had misjudged the danger posed by 
Vietnam.  How, he wanted to know, could American leaders be sure they were not 
making the same mistake in Vietnam?  It was an important, and sadly, a highly 
unusual question.  It was intended to force the president, and those watching at 
home, into rethinking the certainty with which they approached war in Iraq.  An 
additional effect might have been to force a public reexamination of some of the 
articles of faith about the Vietnam War.
The president did not pursue the question that was asked.  Instead, he 
answered the question he thought that most Americans would want answered. 
Would Iraq be like Vietnam?  That is to say, was the U.S. embarking on another 
open-ended struggle with no clear objective in sight?  The answer to that question 
was no, or at least he thought so at the time.  The U.S., as the president indicated 
in several different ways, had a clear objective in Iraq.  One could complain 
that in the process of making that response the president missed the point of the 
question entirely.  But then, so did nearly everyone else.  There were no follow-up 
questions.
Conclusions: 
Anti-war activists of the Vietnam era must be surprised at the extent to 
which the memory of the Vietnam War has been manipulated to support military 
intervention in the Middle East.  The myth of the anti-G.I. protestors has stifled 
dissent and presented formidable obstacles to critics of the present war.  The 
myth of the Liberal Media has likewise constrained the press.  Both of these 
myths rest on collective memories so strongly held that individuals feel no reason 
to test them against available empirical evidence.  Another widely held belief, 
18 “President George Bush Discusses Iraq in National Press Conference,” http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306―8.html
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that America lost in Vietnam because it lacked clear objectives, has failed to act 
as a break on intervention and may also have facilitated the decision to invade 
Iraq.  Given these circumstances, policymakers may actually find that drawing 
on the memories of Vietnam is beneficial to their efforts.  It seems possible 
that reminding the public of America’s failure in Vietnam has the effect of 
automatically reminding the public of the importance of backing “our troops” and 
adopting an uncritical attitude towards the government.  Otherwise, dissent and a 
lack of will could produce another failure in which the troops sacrifice in vain.
At the same time, the personalizing of the war has all but erased the 
Vietnamese from their own war and removed from consideration such vital issues 
as the reasons for American intervention in Vietnam.  Instead, debate has centered 
on whether the war was winnable, in other words did the U.S. have a clearly 
defined objective?  Americans remember the Vietnam War as a mistake.  But they 
seem as yet unwilling to ask how the U.S. got involved.  In light of this reluctance 
to address the central questions of the war, one is tempted to ask if anybody 
knows what we were fighting for.
